We analyze competition through incentive contracts for managers in duopoly. Privately informed managers exert surplus enhancing e¤ort that generates an externality on the rival. Asymmetric information on imperfectly correlated shocks creates a two-way distortion of e¤orts under strategic substitutability in e¤ort and a double downward distortion under strategic complementarity in e¤ort. In the …rst case, as with contracts for R&D activity or small contractual spillovers for quantity and price competition, increasing the correlation of types reduces the polarization of contracts and the di¤erentials in managerial compensations between e¢ cient and ine¢ cient managers. In the second case, as with large contractual spillovers, the opposite occurs.
Introduction
Most of the analysis on principal-agent contracts has been focused on isolated hierarchies where the principal is a monopolist -see Baron and Myerson (1982) or La¤ont and Tirole (1986) -but has ignored, until recently, that the interaction between members of a hierarchy often occurs in an environment of competition with other …rms organized in similar hierarchies. This means that the contracts internal to a single …rm may very well be in ‡uenced by those in place in competing …rms and that …rms do actually compete through the choice of their contracts. The most relevant case concerns the contracts for the top managers, whose payment di¤erentials are often wide (Gabaix and Landier, 2008) and motivated by incentive mechanisms (Jensen and Murphy, 1990;  Murphy, 1999; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999,a) that often interact with analogous mechanisms operating in rival …rms (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999,b; Karuna, 2007) . This is particularly relevant in concentrated sectors where a handful of top managers are directly competing against each other and managerial compensations are characterized by strong incentive mechanisms. However, similar interactions emerge also in other crucial contracts adopted by …rms, such as the incentive contracts for their researchers engaged in product development or for their marketing managers engaged in demand enhancing activities (advertising, product improvements), often with spillovers on other …rms of various type. 1 All these interactions within hierarchies are typically characterized by problems of asymmetric information and shocks that are only partially correlated across …rms, and for these reasons the optimal contract within each hierarchy depends on (and exerts an impact on) the contracts of the rivals.
The aim of this paper is to study the equilibrium of competition in contracts, rather than in quantity or price strategies, in a hidden-information screening model. We will commonly refer to the principal as the …rm's owner, to the agent as its manager, and to the contract as determining e¤ort and managerial compensation, but other applications are possible. We interpret hidden information as relative to the productivity of managers within a particular …rm in the market. This is typical of specialized top managers in oligopolistic markets, especially for multinationals, and allows us to abstract from competition for the managers and focus on competition between …rms through contracts.
We initially present a general model where two …rms strategically choose contracts for their own manager with the appropriate incentives to undertake some costly and surplus enhancing e¤ort. Managers of a …rm can be of two types, e¢ cient or ine¢ cient, where the di¤erence may re ‡ect variable disutility of e¤ort or variable shocks to the …rm-manager productivity. The pro…ts of each …rm, however, depend on the contracts of both …rms through the e¤ort speci…ed in each contract. Initially, we assume that that the types are independently and identically distributed. We start by considering a scenario with full information where competition in contracts amounts to the choice of e¤ort levels and leads to traditional sources of ine¢ ciency. We then introduce asymmetric information within hierarchies and analyze the equilibrium contracts. In this case, new forms of strategic interactions emerge between the e¤ort-wage contracts chosen by the …rms for their managers. In particular, under some regularity conditions for the existence of a unique equilibrium, we show that e¤ort and wage di¤erentials between e¢ cient and ine¢ cient managers are increased when the contracts are strategic substitutes. This is the most common case, as in the presence of contracts on R&D activity to create new products and other managerial tasks aimed at increasing demand or reducing costs under both quantity and price competition: in all these cases, asymmetric information increases the gap between managerial compensations of e¢ cient and ine¢ cient managers. Instead, when the contracts are strategic complements, as contracts for managerial tasks with large positive spillovers on the rivals, competition is softened by asymmetric information and both types of managers are required lower e¤ort levels compared to the case of symmetric information.
Partial correlation of types, due for instance to relevant aggregate shocks, a¤ects equilibrium contracts in novel ways. In the common case of strategic substitutability, an increase in the correlation of types reduces the polarization of contracts and the di¤erentials in executive compensations. Therefore, a lower correlation of shocks faced by …rms increases the comparative advantage of the most productive managers in exerting higher e¤ort and the need to pay them more: in other words, high performance is perceived as due to manager speci…c merits rather than positive common circumstances, and the equilibrium contracts provide larger bonuses for better managers. Accordingly, it is markets characterized by higher variability in managers'abilities and lower importance of aggregate shocks that will be characterized by higher wage di¤erentials. The main testable prediction is that the variance of managerial compensations and the relevance of incentive mechanisms with high payments for e¢ cient managers should be higher in markets characterized by …rm speci…c shocks and lower in markets characterized by high covariance between shocks of competing …rms. However, we also notice that in case of strategic complementarity, for instance when spillovers between …rm's investments are large, the opposite outcome emerges: when the correlation of shocks increases managerial compensations become more diversi…ed.
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The rest of the work is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 presents the general model and the main results in case of uncorrelated types of managers. Section 4 extends the analysis to correlated types. Section 5 contains multiple applications. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Related literature
Our analysis of contract competition is in the spirit of what Myerson (1982) called "principal equilibrium", for which he analyzed conditions for existence. Most of the subsequent studies, however, have been focused on basic moral hazard problems à la Holmstrom-Milgrom within hierarchies. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999,b) have studied the choice of contracts for managers under price and quantity duopoly assuming that managerial compensations depend on the pro…ts of both …rms, which provides a rationale for relative performance evaluation. However, they have not considered heterogeneity between managers with private information as a source of wage di¤erentials. 2 More recently, Lazear (2015) has examined how competition a¤ects the incentives to delegate sales in the presence of moral hazard, but has not considered strategic interactions.
Few hidden information models have analyzed a setting where duopolists engage in price discrimination, generating problems of common agency within a signi…cantly di¤erent context than ours. The most relevant article on screening within an oligopolistic framework is by Martimort (1996) , who compares the pro…tability of exclusive dealing versus a common retailer (a problem of common agency à la Bernheim and Whinston, 1986 ). To analyze the exclusive dealing case, he develops a model with competition through secret contracts. The main …nding is a competing contract e¤ect, that reduces the distortion generated by the standard rent-extraction/e¢ ciency trade-o¤ when goods are substitutes. The contract o¤ered by the rival …rm a¤ects the agent's incentive constraints directly, therefore modifying the marginal cost of inducing e¤ort. Instead, in our model the rival …rm's contract a¤ects the objective function of the principal directly and modi…es the marginal bene…t of e¤ort. Moreover Martimort (1996) and subsequent applications by Brainard and Martimort (1996) or Piccolo et al. (2008) assume that private information is perfectly correlated, while we allow for independent or imperfectly correlated types. All these earlier works show that the agency con ‡ict inside the hierarchy is solved in a familiar way, with no distortion at the top and a downward distortion for the ine¢ cient types. Contrary to this, we show that strategic interactions between hierarchies bias the equilibrium contracts in the presence of asymmetric information for 2 The same focus on moral hazard applies in the analysis by Baggs and de Bettignies (2007). 4 both e¢ cient and ine¢ cient types. Our …ndings on the increase in e¤ort by e¢ cient types may be reminiscent of the countervailing incentives literature -see Lewis and Sappington (1989) , where an agent's incentive to over-report or underreport depend on its own type. However, in our model an agent has always an incentive to over-report his disutility from e¤ort. 3 In Etro and Cella (2013) we have analyzed contract competition in a speci…c example with cost reducing activities for a linear Cournot oligopoly with a continuum of (uncorrelated) types of managers. In that example, characterized by strategic substitutability, asymmetric information ampli…es the wage di¤erentials between low productivity and high productivity managers, and an increase in the number of …rms increases the compensation di¤erentials between (any) two types of managers, which suggests a positive relation between competition and high-powered incentives. We complement those …nd-ings showing that the wage di¤erentials increase also when shocks between managers become less correlated for any model characterized by strategic substitutability in contracts, and we study the case of strategic complementarity.
Our work is also related to the theory of superstars, which is typically based on models with perfect competition and full information (Rosen, 1981; Gabaix and Landier, 2008) .
Introducing imperfect competition and asymmetric information provides an additional rationale for large wage di¤erentials in highly concentrated industries with …erce competition, such as the movie industry, the music industry or the sport industry. Consider sport teams that compete in contracts with new athlets whose productivity within a team is (at least in part) a private information. Each contract sets a compensation and requires a certain e¤ort (say in training, in the competition activity or in other collateral activities). Clearly, the e¤ort of each athlet a¤ects the expected payo¤ of every team at the competition stage, and it is natural to assume that contracts are strategic substitutes: higher productivity in one team reduces the incentives to invest in productivity in an other team. This situation creates naturally large contractual di¤erentials.
What we show is that these di¤erentials should enlarge when the correlation between the productivities of the athlets within their teams is lower.
The model
Consider two …rms (hierarchies), i and j, choosing contracts for their managers. A contract between the owner of …rm i (principal ) and its manager (agent) determines e¤ort e i and the wage w i . Given the contracts in place, the pro…ts of …rm i are given by:
where e j is the e¤ort required by …rm j for its own manager. We assume that the pro…t function of each …rm is symmetric, increasing and non-convex in the e¤ort of its manager, 1 e i ; e j > 0 and 11 e i ; e j 0. However, we allow for negative or positive spillovers from the other …rm (of course, in the absence of spillovers contract competition has no bite). The sign of the cross derivative 12 e i ; e j can be negative if more e¤ort from the rival reduces the marginal pro…tability of e¤ort, or positive if the opposite e¤ect happens:
we therefore allow for strategic substitutability between contracts ( 12 e i ; e j < 0) or strategic complementarity ( 12 e i ; e j > 0).
Given a contract e i ; w i the utility of the manager of …rm i of type k = 1; 2 is:
where i k parametrizes disutility from e¤ort. This satis…es standard assumptions: A.1.: The disutility of e¤ort is increasing and convex in e¤ort, i.e. g e > 0 and g ee 0, it is increasing in type, i.e. g > 0, and such that g e > 0 (Spence-Mirrlees condition) and g ee ( ; e) 0.
The payo¤ from the outside option for any manager is normalized to zero. Each manager can be of type 1 (e¢ cient manager) or of type 2 > 1 (ine¢ cient manager), and we will consider both the cases of uncorrelated shocks and correlated shocks. The total surplus created in hierarchy i with a manager of type i k is:
and the aggregate surplus for the two hierarchies is:
Its maximization under full information de…nes the …rst best e¤ort levels e F B ij when the manager of …rm i is of type i and the manager of …rm j is of type j . These …rst best contracts solve four optimality conditions expressed as follows: 4 1 e F B ij ; ee 4 In what follows we assume that the appropriate second order conditions are satis…ed.
6 and the surplus can be allocated across …rms'owners and managers through the choice of wages w i and w j depending on the allocation of the bargaining power within hierarchies.
We will repeatedly illustrate our results with two examples of this general model.
The …rst is based on a direct impact of contracts on pro…tability, and the second on a two stage competition where contracts are chosen in the …rst stage.
Example 1: Contract competition in R&D Our simplest example is a model of competition for the market. Consider …rms that invest to innovate and create a new product whose value is normalized to unity. In this case we can think of the agents as research teams that spend e¤ort or resources to come up with a new (patentable) product and conquer its market. E¤ort determines the probability of success (innovation) as e i 2 [0; 1] for …rm i, and the disutility of e¤ort is assumed quadratic in the probability of success g ( ; e) = e 2 =2 where we assume > 2. The probability of establishing a monopoly in the new market is e i (1 e j ), that is the probability that i innovates and j does not; we assume that both …rms obtain zero net value if they both innovate (which happens with probability e i e j ) because in this case they are engaged in a price war that dissipates all pro…ts.
Given two contracts (e i ; w i ) and (e j ; w j ), …rm i obtains the expected gross pro…ts:
with 12 (e i ; e j ) = 1, which implies strategic substitutability. The total surplus created in hierarchy i is:
and it can be easily veri…ed that the …rst best contracts specify the e¤ort levels e F B ij = j 2 i j 4 for i; j = 1; 2. This will represent our workhorse example of a model with strategic substitutability in contracts.
Example 2: Two-stage competition with spillovers We now consider managers engaged in a demand-enhancing activity, say advertising, aimed at increasing the willingness to pay for their products (or, equivalently a cost-reducing activity, say R&D).
This pursuit is often characterized by spillovers: when a …rm spends resources to advertise a good or improve its technology, it may increase the demand for its own product (or reduce its cost), but may also induce positive spillover on the demand of susbstitute goods (or on the cost function of the rivals).
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Consider a …rm i producing quantity x i with pro…ts:
where a parametrizes the intensity of demand and c the marginal cost, while e i and e j represent the investment in advertising (cost reduction) and b > 0 represents the size of the spillovers on the rival. When b = 0 the investment of a …rm does not a¤ect the pro…ts of the other …rm, and when b = 1 it a¤ects the pro…ts of both …rms without distinction.
At the second stage, once contracts are public, …rms compete in quantities. The reaction function of …rm i is
The production of a …rm is decreasing in the production of the rival because of strategic substitutability between output strategies, but it is also increasing in the e¤ort of the rival, because this increases the price of both …rms. This suggests that advertising by one …rm exerts two e¤ects on the …nal output of the rival: the direct one is positive, due to the demand enhancing role of ads, and the indirect one is negative, due to the expansion of the output of the rival. Let us solve for the Cournot equilibrium quantities:
It is now clear that with small spillovers (b < 1=2) the advertising activity reduces the production of the rival, but with large spillovers (b > 1=2) the advertising activity increases the output of the rival. We can …nally derive the gross pro…ts as:
This expression is increasing or decreasing in the ads of the rival if respectively b > 1=2 or b < 1=2. More importantly, the impact of advertising on the marginal pro…tability of a rival can be derived as follows 12 (e i ; e j ) = (2 b) (2b 1) =6 p e i e j , which shows that we may have either strategic substitutability, when b < 1=2, or strategic complementarity,
In applications that follow, we will focus on the case of large spillovers, in particular with b = 1. Therefore pro…ts will be:
with 12 (e i ; e j ) = 1=6 p e i e j > 0. We will adopt a linear disutility of e¤ort, g ( ; e) = e, with > 4=9. Total surplus within hierarchy i with manager of type k will read as:
The …rst best e¤ort levels can be derived as
for managers of types i ; j with i; j = 1; 2. This will represent our workhorse example of a model with strategic complementarity in contracts.
Contract competition with full information
As a benchmark for our future analysis of contract competition, let us consider the case in which managers'types are common knowledge, so that there is full information within hierarchies and also across hierarchies. Given the types i k and j k for the two managers, each …rm creates the surplus:
The full information Nash equilibrium requires that contracts are decided within each hierarchy independently and taking as given the contracts of the other …rm. Given full information, each hierarchy can choose its e¤ort e i to maximize its own surplus and allocate the latter between principal and agent through the wage w i . This allows one to easily derive the equilibrium e¤ort levels de…ned as e ij when one manager is of type i and the other of type j. The equilibrium is summarized in the following: Lemma 1. Contract competition with full information implies that, in case of managers of the same type, the equilibrium e¤ ort levels satisfy:
e¤ort. In the example of competition for the market it can be easily veri…ed that:
In the example of two-stage competition with large demand spillovers we have:
In both cases we have e ij < e F B ij for any i; j. 5 This is a traditional ine¢ ciency: the …rst best corresponds to collusion in contracts between …rms to maximize their joint pro…ts, and Nash competition in contracts leads to lower total pro…ts. The nature of the strategic interaction is analogous to traditional forms of competition in prices or quantities under full information, because only one aspect of the contracts (e¤ort) is the relevant strategic variable.
Contract competition with uncertainty
We now introduce uncertain information across hierarchies. We start by assuming that …rms are a¤ected by independent shocks, in the sense that the types of managers are independently distributed: each manager can be of type 1 with probability or type 2 > 1 with probability 1 .
At the contract stage, each …rm knows the type of its own manager but not that of the other …rm, and can condition its contract only on the former. In other words, there is uncertainty on the type of the other …rm's manager, but there is no asymmetric information within each hierarchy in this setup. Contracts are chosen simultaneously taking as given those o¤ered by the other …rm and we look for a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in contracts. Notice that the contract o¤ers are necessarily incomplete in the sense that one …rm cannot condition its own contract on the type of the other …rm's manager. 6 As a consequence only two di¤erent contracts emerge in a symmetric equilibrium, one for an e¢ cient manager and one for an ine¢ cient manager.
The optimal contract (e i k ; w i k ) for a …rm i with a manager of type k maximizes its expected surplus:
and the optimality conditions are:
which, for given e¤ort levels of the rival …rm (i.e. given e j 1 and e j 2 ), provide the optimal e¤ort levels e i 1 and e i 2 . Since we are looking for a symmetric equilibrium we set e i k = e j k e k and obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 Under Assumption A.1, the equilibrium e¤ ort levels of contract competition with full information within hierarchies and uncertainty on the rival type must satisfy:
1 (e 2 ; e 1 ) + (1 ) 1 (e 2 ; e 2 ) = g e ( 2 ; e 2 )
with e 1 > e 2 .
It is important to remark that the two conditions (17) and (18) are not two reaction functions, but they are two equilibrium relations that link the e¤ort levels required from e¢ cient and ine¢ cient managers. Of course, comparing (17) and (18) in Proposition 1 with (13) and (14) in Lemma 1 shows that for ! 0 we have e 2 ! e 22 and for ! 1
we have e 1 ! e 11 . However, in general, uncertainty about the other …rm's manager type in ‡uences the optimal e¤ort of a …rm because it a¤ects its marginal bene…t of e¤ort, and the …nal impact depends on whether the pro…t function exhibits strategic substitutability or complementarity in contracts.
The equilibrium condition (17) can be solved for the equilibrium e¤ort of the e¢ cient managers as a function of the equilibrium e¤ort of the ine¢ cient ones:
The slope of this relation in the space (e 2 ; e 1 ) is: whose sign depends on the numerator once we assume that the denominator is positive. 7 The equilibrium condition (18) can be solved for an analogous equilibrium relation:
with slope: jh e (e; )j > jf e (e; )j
In the space (e 2 ; e 1 ) this implies that the function h (e 2 ; 2 ) crosses f (e 2 ; 1 ) once and from above under strategic substitutability, while the function h (e 2 ; 2 ) crosses f (e 2 ; 1 ) once and from below under strategic complementarity. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium in contracts must be at the unique crossing of the two relations. As before, wages w i k and w 
The two equilibrium conditions under symmetry can be derived as two linearly decreasing relations:
with intercepts h (0; 2 ) = 1= > f (0; 1 ) = 1= ( + 1 ) and slopes:
jh e (e; )j = 1
satisfying the condition (21). Accordingly we have a unique equilibrium, whose closed form solutions for the e¤ort levels are:
as shown in Figure 1 . Notice that both e¤ort levels decrease in the probability of e¢ ciency and the high (low) e¤ort increases (decreases) with the gap between types.
Example 2: Two-stage competition with large spillovers To verify what happens under strategic complementarity, let us consider our example with two-stage competition and large spillovers. Using (11), the expected surplus for …rm i with manager of type k is:
The two equilibrium conditions under symmetry can be better expressed in terms of squared e¤orts:
which are linearly increasing relations as those shown in Figure 2 -clearly, the square of these expressions provides the equilibrium relations e 1 = f (e 2 ; 1 ) and e 1 = h (e 2 ; 2 )
as quadratic expressions satisfying assumption A:2. They cross only once at the following e¤ort levels:
which are also increasing in the scale of the market a c.
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Contract competition with asymmetric information
In this section we …nally move to asymmetric information and make the assumption that managers have private information on their productivity within each hierarchy. One can think of managers as specialists in the di¤erentiated production of each …rm, each one with private information on productivity. This is typical of top managers in oligopolistic markets, and allows us to abstract from competition for the managers. When o¤ering a contract each principal optimally screens for its own manager's type and takes as given the optimal contractual behavior of the rival …rm. 9 In this case, both elements of a contract (e¤ort and wage) and the allocation of property rights a¤ect directly the surplus created in a hierarchy and, indirectly, in the other hierarchy.
Therefore the same allocation of bargaining power between principal and agent within hierachies does a¤ect the equilibrium outcomes. Accordingly, following most of the principal-agent literature, we will now assume that the principal is the …rm's ower 10 and 8 Biglaiser and Mezzetti (2000) have considered auctions to hire managers in a principal-agent framework. With identical principals, the equilibrium gives all the surplus to each type of worker. 9 As mentioned before we always assume that …rm i's contract cannot be conditioned on the type of the manager of …rm j or, more generally, on messages sent from that …rm. The literature on competing mechanisms has investigated equilibria of this kind in di¤erent frameworks -see, for a survey, Peters (2014).
1 0 More e¢ cient solutions to the moral hazard problem could be reached by changing the ownership structure and selling the right to control to the manager. However wealth constraints make this solution often unrealistic (see Lewis and Sappington, 2000 , for a general treatment), and we will not consider it here.
14 can exercise bargaining power with "take-it or leave-it" o¤ers to the manager. 11 Exploiting the Reveleation Principle for Bayesian implementation (see Myerson, 1982) , 12 the optimal contract of each …rm must maximize expected pro…ts over the four possible states of the world subject to both participation and incentive compatibility constraints for its manager and taking as given the contract of the other …rm. As before we look for a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in contracts. The optimization problem for each …rm owner i is: where (e i 1 ; w i 1 ) and (e i 2 ; w i 2 ) are the contracts o¤ered by …rm i to its manager of type 1 and 2 respectively. The …rst pair of constraints ensure participation while the second one guarantees truthtelling. Since the contract of the other …rm is taken as given, standard arguments imply that the binding constraints are the participation constraint for the ine¢ cient manager and the incentive compatibility constraint for the e¢ cient one. 13 This allows us to state the individually rational and incentive compatible wages as follows: For given e¤ort levels of the rival …rm (e j k for its two possible types), these conditions can be compared to (16): they provide a standard constrained optimal mechanism for the choice of contracts in the presence of asymmetric information, and they show nodistortion on the top and downward distortion at the bottom. Taking strategic interactions into account, however, introduces deeper di¤erences compared to the benchmark without asymmetric information (17)- (18). Since we are looking for a symmetric equilibrium we set e i k = e j k = e k and obtain:
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions A.1, contract competition with asymmetric information within hierarchies generates e¤ ort levels e 1 > e 2 such that: 
The latter is related to the earlier relation, but incorporates an additional factor due to the informational rent. This shifts the h function inward compared to the h function, as shown in Figures 1 and 2 The equilibrium conditions show that, as usual, the informational rent "virtually"
increases the marginal cost of e¤ort for an ine¢ cient manager. However, the same informational rent creates new consequences on the marginal bene…t of e¤ort for an e¢ cient manager. To understand these consequences we compare the e¤ort levels that result in this framework with asymmetric information and those that emerge in the framework with uncertainty of the previous section:
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions A.1-2, under contract competition with asymmetric information within hierarchies, strategic substitutability in contracts implies e 1 > e 1 and e 2 < e 2 , and strategic complementarity in contracts implies e 1 < e 1 and e 2 < e 2 .
Graphically, it is immediate to verify that, under our assumptions the consequence of asymmetric information is to reduce the e¤ort by ine¢ cient managers always and change the e¤ort of e¢ cient managers in a way that depends on the nature of the strategic relation: when e¤orts are strategic substitutes, asymmetric information induces higher e¤ort by the e¢ cient managers, but when they are strategic complements, it creates a downward distortion also for the e¢ cient managers.
The intuition for this result relies on uncertainty and on the strategic interaction between contracts. In the presence of asymmetric information, each principal tends to distort downward the e¤ort and the compensation of the ine¢ cient manager. In the absence of strategic interactions between contracts, as in case of isolated hierarchies, each principal would not distort the e¤ort of the e¢ cient manager. However, if there is strategic substitutability between contracts, the reduction in the e¤ort of the ine¢ cient managers increases the expected marginal pro…tability of e¤ort of the e¢ cient managers, generating the optimality of an upward distortion of their e¤ort levels. This reinforces the need of a downward distortion of the e¤ort of the ine¢ cient managers, and the assumption that guarantees the existence of a unique equilibrium guarantees also that the process converges. To the contrary, if there is strategic complementarity, the lower e¤ort of the ine¢ cient managers reduces the expected marginal pro…tability of the e¤ort of the e¢ cient managers and induces each principal to distort downward that e¤ort as well. Again, this induces a feedback on the ine¢ cient managers, requiring an even lower e¤ort, but the process converges to an equilibrium under our assumptions.
Example 1: Contract competition in R&D Let us return to our example where two …rms are engaged in a competition for the market with strategic substitutability in contracts. In this case we have (e) ( 2 1 ) e 2 =2 and the equilibrium under asymmetric information provides:
These contracts exhibit polarization of e¤orts and managerial compensations compared to the case without asymmetric information.
Example 2: Two-stage competition with large spillovers In the example of two-stage competition with strategic complementarity in contracts we can derive the equilibrium e¤ort levels as follows:
< p e 1 ; p e 2 = (a c) (9 1 1)
where we de…ned the virtual type~ 2 2 + 1 ( 2 1 ) > 2 . E¤orts are now distorted downward.
It is important to remark that the equilibrium contractual properties of two-stage competition do not depend on the form of competition in the last stage, but from the nature of the interactions between contracts. For instance, when managerial e¤ort exerts small spillovers on the rival and goods are substitutes in the …nal market, strategic substitutability occurs under both quantity and price competition, which makes this case much more relevant for practical purposes compared to the case of strategic complemen-tarity. 14 To verify this, we will conclude this section presenting a simple example based on price competition in the second stage without spillovers between contracts.
Example 3: Hotelling competition with marketing costs To provide an example with price competition, let us consider a simple model à la Hotelling (1929) . Firms are located at both ends of a unit segment and consumers are uniformly distributed along this segment with the indirect utility U = max i=1;2 a p i d i e i , where p i is the price charged by producer i for a unit of good and a is the maximum willingness to pay for the good. Moreover, d i is the distance from producer i = 1; 2, and the marketing investment e i reduces the cost of this distance for every consumer. In a …rst stage each manager chooses the marketing cost. In a second stage, uncertainty is resolved and …rms compete in prices. Firm i has demand D i = (1 + p j p i + e i e j )=2 and sets prices to maximize its pro…ts:
taking as given the price choice of the rival and the contracts. The reaction functions are p i = c + 1 + e i e j + p j =2, and the equilibrium prices are:
As usual price competition is characterized by strategic complementarity in prices. However, gross pro…ts exhibit strategic substitutability in the e¤ort levels. Indeed, replacing (30) in (29) we obtain:
(e i ; e j ) = 1 + e i e j 3
1 + e i e j 2 ;
whose cross derivative is 12 (e i ; e j ) = 1=3. As a consequence, a two-way distortion of e¤ort levels emerges under contract competition with asymmetric information.
Imperfectly Correlated Types
In this section we generalize our model to allow for imperfectly correlated types of managers. Indeed, the limit case of perfect correlation between types of managers is well known in the literature since Martimort (1996) . If managers are always hit by the same shocks, the two hierarchies are virtually independent and the equilibrium contracts under uncertainty correspond to those obtained in (13) , and under asymmetric information they are characterized by the classic no-distortion at the top and downward distortion at the bottom, without interdependence. Here we will study the case of imperfect correlation, in which contractual interdependence bites.
Let us assume that the joint prior probability distribution is given as follows:
always given by Pr ( 1 ) = and Pr ( 2 ) = 1 . Because of correlation, given the type of manager in a …rm, its principal can update the priors on the distribution of the other …rm manager's type. The posteriors, computed using Bayes rule Pr ( i j j ) = Pr ( j j i ) Pr ( i ) = Pr ( j ), are:
The parameter is directly related to the correlation of types ex post:
which motivates our focus on the range 2 [0; ] where the upper bound = (1 )
corresponds to the case of perfect correlation.
Consider full information within hierachies and uncertainty across hierarchies. The objective function of a principal that knows the type of its own manager will now depend on that type since the induced posterior probability distribution over the types of the other …rm's manager are di¤erent. The principal, whose manager is of type k , will now maximize expected pro…ts: 
Clearly, this system implies e 1 (0) = e 1 and e 2 (0) = e 2 as de…ned in Proposition 1, and e 1 ( ) = e 11 and e 2 ( ) = e 22 as de…ned in Lemma 1.
When we move to the case of asymmetric information inside each hierarchy, informational rents have to be paid to e¢ cient types. 15 Each principal chooses contracts to maximize expected pro…ts under the individual rationality constraint for the ine¢ cient manager and the incentive compatibility constraint for the e¢ cient one. The equilibrium conditions for the levels of e¤ort e 1 ( ) and e 2 ( ) can be now derived as: 
The system has a unique equilibrium under assumption A:1 2 for any 2 [0; ]. 16 This system implies e 1 (0) = e 1 and e 2 (0) = e 2 as de…ned in Proposition 2, and e 1 ( ) = e 11 as de…ned in Lemma 1 with e 2 ( ) characterized by the same downward distortion that asymmetric information generates within a single …rm. For 2 (0; ) strategic interactions between contracts play a new role and our aim is to verify how correlation a¤ects the equilibrium contracts. The e¤ect of correlation on contract competition depends on whether the principal's pro…t function exhibits strategic substitutability or complementarity.
Strategic substitutability
The following proposition summarizes the results for the case of strategic substitutability:
Proposition 4 Under Assumptions A.1-2 and strategic substitutability, contract compe-1 5 Again, we exclude the possibility of conditioning contracts on messages from the other manager. As is well known since Cremer and McLean (1985) , this would allow principals to exploit correlation in a more e¢ cient way -see Bertoletti and Poletti (1997) and La¤ont and Martimort (2000) for related applications. However, in our context, contracts based on e¤ort of other managers do not appear realistic. 1 6 The generalized slopes he (e2; 2; 1; ) and fe (e2; 1; ) satisfy jhe (e2; 2; 1; )j > jfe (e2; 1; )j. Notice that fe (e2; 1; ) = 0 and he (e2; 2; 1; ) ! 1.
tition with asymmetric information on imperfectly correlated types implies that the e¤ ort of the e¢ cient manager decreases and the e¤ ort of the ine¢ cient manager increases with the degree of correlation, so that di¤ erentials in managerial compensation decrease.
Once again we can use our graphical apparatus to interpret this result. In front of an increase in correlation of types the e¢ cient manager puts more weight on the state of the world in which competition occurs with an e¢ cient rival, which reduces its marginal pro…tability of e¤ort and shifts inward the relation f in Figure 1 . At the same time, the ine¢ cient manager puts more weight on the state of the world in which there will be competition with an ine¢ cient rival, which increases its marginal pro…tability of e¤ort and shifts outward the relation h in Figure 1 . This unambiguously increases e¤ort by the ine¢ cient manager and decreases e¤ort by the e¢ cient manager.
The mechanism at work is crucial here: an increase in the correlation of the shocks faced by …rms reduces the wage di¤erentials between e¢ cient and ine¢ cient managers because it reduces the comparative advantage of the most productive managers in exerting higher e¤ort. High performance is now perceived as due to positive common circumstances rather than manager speci…c merits, and the equilibrium contracts reduce the di¤erentiation between managers. Accordingly, markets characterized by higher variability in managers' abilities and lower importance of aggregate shocks in a¤ect-ing pro…tability will be characterized by higher wage di¤erentials, which is the main empirical prediction of this theoretical framework.
Example 1: Contract competition in R&D Let us go back for the last time to our initial example of competition in contracts for the conquest of a new market. With imperfect correlation, the equilibrium in contracts provides:
where e 1 ( ) = 1=( 1 + 1) and e 2 ( ) = 1=(~ 2 + 1). Labeling ( ) the denominator of the e¤ort levels, we can obtain easily the following comparative statics:
which con…rms that contract polarization increases when decreases. Most of all, the equilibrium wage di¤erential between e¢ cient and ine¢ cient agents is:
which is always decreasing in and in the correlation index = = (1 ). Under strategic substitutability in contracts, the gap between managerial compensations is higher when the correlation of managerial talent is low, or when …rms are hit by independent shocks.
Strategic complementarity
The case of strategic complementarity does not provide immediate results of comparative statics. In Figure 2 , an increase in correlation of types shifts upward the relation f , which would push for an increase in e¤ort of both types, but it also shifts upward the relation h, which operates in the opposite direction. Nevertheless we can unambiguously determine what happens at the two extreme cases of zero and perfect correlation:
Proposition 5 Under Assumptions A.1-2 and strategic complementarity, contract competition with asymmetric information on imperfectly correlated types implies that the e¤ ort of the e¢ cient manager increases and the e¤ ort of the ine¢ cient manager decreases when moving from zero to perfect correlation, so that di¤ erentials in managerial compensation increase.
This suggests that over some range an increase in leads to higher e¤ort by the e¢ cient managers and lower e¤ort by the ine¢ cient ones. An increase in the correlation of the shocks faced by …rms tends to increase the wage di¤erentials between e¢ cient and ine¢ cient managers: indeed, when the correlation increases, the high performance of a manager is perceived as due to positive common circumstances, which can be better exploited by the most e¢ cient managers compared to the least e¢ cient managers.
Example 2: Two-stage competition with large spillovers In the example of two-stage competition we can derive the equilibrium e¤ort levels as follows:
Notice that
and it can be also veri…ed that e 0 1 ( ) > 0 and e 0 2 ( ) < 0 for any . The equilibrium wage di¤erential between e¢ cient and ine¢ cient agents is now:
(1 )
which is always increasing in and = = (1 ): under strategic complementarity in contracts, managerial compensations diverge when …rms are hit by more similar shocks.
Commitments, entry and empirical predictions
When contracts are strategic substitutes, each …rm has an incentive to adopt aggressive contracts which require an e¢ cient manager to overinvest in e¤ort and an ine¢ cient contract to underinvest. This leads to a duopolistic equilibrium where …rms are aggressive and would gain from reducing their investments, a typical result of strategic games. As we have argued, this is the natural outcome of models with R&D investments or with two stage competition between …rms producing substitute goods and competing either in quantities or prices as long as the spillovers between contracts are limited.
The case of strategic complementarity induces …rms to behave in an accommodating way, reducing the e¤ort required from both e¢ cient and ine¢ cient managers. This softening of competition through contracts allows …rms to increase their pro…ts. How-ever, this case appears only as a theoretical possibility for two reasons. First, it requires extremely large spillovers between contracts (or goods complementarity), independently from the form of the …nal competition in the market. Second, as well known from the theory of endogenous market structures (see Etro, 2011 ,and Bertoletti and Etro, 2016), accommodating strategies tend to increase pro…ts in the short run but also to attract entry in the long run. Taking endogenous entry into account, each …rm would have an incentive to behave in an aggressive way independently from whether strategic substitutability or complementarity holds.
The extension of our analysis to oligopoly and endogenous entry has been analyzed in Etro and Cella (2013) , showing that an increase in the number of …rms increases the compensation di¤erentials between (any) two types of managers, which suggests a …rst empirical prediction: a positive relation between competition and high-powered incentives. Here we have seen that a reduction in the correlation of shocks increases the compensation di¤erentials, which suggests a second empirical prediction: a negative relation between covariance of industry shocks and high-powered incentives.
Conclusion
In this work we have analyzed the choice of incentive contracts by competing hierarchies.
Asymmetric information on imperfectly correlated shocks creates a two-way distortion of e¤orts in markets where there is strategic substitutability, which is typical of markets with both quantity and price competition and investments in R&D or demand enhancing activities with small spillovers. In this case a lower correlation of managerial talent or shocks to pro…tability increases the polarization of contracts and the compensation di¤erential between managers.
Further investigations may study the welfare impact of contract competition and analyze more complex forms of this form of competition, such as competition with more complex contracts based on pro…ts or contracts of the rivals (relative performance evaluation) or competition between a private …rm and a regulated …rm. 17 rium e¤ort levels (e 1 ; e 2 ) with respect to when 12 (e 1 ; e 2 ) < 0 we totally di¤erentiate the equilibrium system: Proof of Proposition 5. To compare extreme e¤ort levels under the assumption 12 (e 1 ; e 2 ) > 0, let us consider the e¤ort of the e¢ cient manager …rst. Notice that e 1 (0) = e 1 as de…ned in (24): 1 (e 1 ; e 1 ) + (1 ) 1 (e 1 ; e 2 ) = g e ( 1 ; e 1 ) ;
and e 1 ( ) = e 11 as de…ned in (13):
1 (e 11 ; e 11 ) = g e ( 1 ; e 11 ) :
30
Strategic complementarity and e 1 > e 2 imply 1 (e 1 ; e 1 ) > 1 (e 1 ; e 2 ) and therefore e 1 ( ) = e 11 > e 1 (0) = e 1 .
Consider the e¤ort of the ine¢ cient manager now. Notice that e 2 (0) = e 2 as de…ned in (25): 1 (e 2 ; e 1 ) + (1 ) 1 (e 2 ; e 2 ) = g e ( 2 ; e 2 ) + 1 e (e 2 ; 1 ; 2 ) ; while e 2 ( ) must satisfy:
1 (e 2 ( ); e 2 ( )) = g e ( 2 ; e 2 ( )) + 1 e (e 2 ( ); 1 ; 2 ) :
For any e 1 > e 2 strategic complementarity implies 1 (e 2 ; e 1 ) > 1 (e 2 ; e 2 ), therefore e 2 = e 2 (0) > e 2 ( ).
